MOUNT LAUREL AND URBAN POSSIBILITY:
WHAT SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IGHT
TELL THE NARRATIVES OF FUTILITY
David D. Trouu*
As the recent Wish-Eisdorfer study' indirectly demonstrates, Mount
Laurel' is now history. The findings show that it is living history and
continues to evolve, but, as a dynamic, Mount Laurel unfolds into the
future with an observable past in its trail. What began in May 1971 with
the filing in state court of a lawsuit alleging racial and economically discriminatory zoning denials in the provision of suburban housing, has
swallowed much of land use planning law, notions of home rule, the exclusivity of property rights, the allocation of judicial and legislative
power-all at the intersection of race, class and urban-suburban space.
The more Mount Laurel becomes our history, the more it will be remembered differently by different people within it. My review today is limited to the way it will be recalled in New Jersey communities by the
state's residents.

" Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School-Newark. The author wishes to
thank all of the conference participants for their helpful insights. Special thanks to my
colleague John Payne for his thoughtful suggestions and the generosity of his time. All
mistakes are my own.
1 See generally NAOMI BAIuN WISH & STEPHEN EIsDORFER, THE IMPACT OF THE
MOuNT LAUREL INrtIAThVES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF APPUiCANTS AND
OCCUPANTS (1996).
2 The term "Mount Laurel" is here used more broadly than in the Wish-Eisdorfer

study and well beyond what is often called the Mount Laurel Doctrine. The term encompasses the specific litigations that bear the township's name, as well as other related
cases, the legislative response from the private sector, public interest community and the
New Jersey legislature through the creation of the Council on Affordable Housing
(COAH). Mount Laurel therefore refers to the peculiar institutionalization of a multifaceted process.
For ease of reference, the trilogy of New Jersey Supreme Court decisions in which
the main features of the legal doctrine were articulated shall be referred to hereafter as
"Mount Laurel 1,* Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), "Mount Laurel II," Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) and "Mourn
Laurel 117," Hills Development Co. v. Bernards Township, 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621

(1986).
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As we consider what Mount Laurel's objectives were and whether
the process has met them, we must recognize at the same time how
Mount Laurel will be told differently through different narratives.' Narratives function to sustain events in public consciousness, to define the
reality of their existence, as well as to bury or mute their memory.'
There will be stories with an African-American cast, 5 others that typify
Latino experiences of the process and white versions, even dominant versions. 6 There will be urban narratives and suburban narratives7 , legal
3 The use of narrative perspectives as a tool in legal analysis has been irregular but
nevertheless frequent in a range of legal scholarship over the last decade or so. For examples of thoughtful approaches directly or indirectly relevant to this essay, see generally
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87
MIcH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) (illustrating how social reality is constructed through stories
and pleading for counterstories); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out
of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives,45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (commenting and
critiquing the "distinctive" mode of storytelling offered by critical race theorists); Charles
R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy As ScholarshipAs Struggle, 65 S.
CAL.L. REV. 2231 (1992) (describing paradigm of the Word and its possible functions in
legal discourse and distinguishing between dominant and outsider narratives); Mari J.
Matsuda, PublicResponse to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2320 (1989) (applying the narrative tool of victims' stories in prosecutions for racist
speech); Robin West, JurisprudenceAs Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 (1985)(advocating the reading of legal theory as a
form of narrative by drawing parallels between four literary and jurisprudential traditions); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2225 (1989)(describing consistent cognitive elements in commonly used legal narratives).
4 For example, a narrative of futility has echoed from different quarters regarding
the War on Poverty. Conservative policymakers such as Newt Gingrich and Republican
political candidates have regularly derided its aims as though, in practice, no public benefit resulted from any of the vast range of federal enactments during the mid- to late 1960s.
Objective evidence of success in programs such as Head Start and Job Corps is, however,
perhaps deliberately, ignored in these recitals of historical events. Arguably, the effect of
these narratives is to reduce support for public programs aimed at the poor.
Similarly, the Watts uprising/riot of 1965 gave rise to the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders ("Kerner Commission Report"). As a result, the
terror, personal loss and myriad circumstances of that and other urban explosions of the
era have been encapsulated in the Kerner Commission Report. The event became synonymous with all postmodern urban riots, and the report itself defines a lexicon of normative, politically liberal discourse on issues of racial inequity. It is referred to as a
metaphor for the perpetuation of racial division, particularly in cities. In contrast, the
1992 uprising/riot in South Central Los Angeles yielded no such defining document. Despite the event's greater devastation and its uniqueness in the contemporary state of U.S.
cities, its public historical memory outside of Los Angeles has been largely muted.
5 See Robert C. Holmes, A Black Perspective on Mount Laurel II: Toward A Black
"FairShare, " 14 SETON HALLL. REv. 944 (1984).
6 For example, one Mount Laurel resident was quoted as saying, "No way do I feel I
should subsidize a fifty-thousand dollar home for them. Nobody's doing it for me....
Nobody has a right to say anybody owes them anything." DAVID KJRP ET AL., OUR
ToWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA 7 (1995).
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and policy narratives. Many factors will determine the content of these
stories. What social science research can tell us in trying to understand

Mount Laurel- which is one goal of this essay- is really a question of
compensating for the gaps in understanding left by the dominant legal
narrative. The legal narrative emanates from the court decisions, even
the subsequent legislative language, and typically speaks with no discernible community voice. Yet it is community voices that tell the different stories that compete for historical meaning. The first thing that

social science can do is minimize the differences among them by plugging
the gaps in the facts on which they are based.

All of this is especially important now when the meaning of Mount
Laurel and its legacy is at risk of folding into one of two futility narratives. I use the term to describe narratives that, with more or less support, chronicle systematic failures of a legal and policy vision. Such narratives often trade on the narrator's long-held suspicions about the vision

itself. In that way, futility narratives have the resonance of confirmed
belief, giving the strength of I-told-you-so to each subsequent repeater.
Although powerful opinion makers with the capacity to kill social
change,s these narratives are often weak on facts. The two futility narra-

The ironies abound in this common suburban narrative, which combine to make
them symbolic of a dominant version. For one, the speaker assumes the position of the
giver and ignores Mount Laurel's long history of African American residents and the
original claimants' mere demand for a zoning variance not unlike those granted to large
developers. The position of the taker is 'them." They unfairly want subsidies, while
what benefits the speaker receives from public sources, such as mortgage interest deductions, are his by right and merit.
At least one commentator has argued the existence of "master narratives" that on the
one hand sustain white notions of black inferiority and on the other reinforce the necessity
of segregation. The myths undergirding this narrative in the housing realm include dominant white imagery used by the real estate industry and notions that black successes in
housing integration necessarily mean white losses. At its worst, the master narrative in
housing leads to physical and symbolic acts of violence against blacks in white neighborhoods. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, The RacialLimits of the Fair Housing Act: The
Intersection of Dominant White Images, the Violence of Neighborhood Purity, and the
Master Narrative of Black Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 69 (1995). Professor
Robinson further argues that "[tihe Fair Housing Act [Title VIII] cannot effectively redress housing segregation until it recognizes the impact of the relationship between master
narrative of black inferiority, dominant white images, and the violence of neighborhood
purity." Id. at 84. The Mount Laurel process and the New Jersey Fair Housing Act may
suffer similar deficiencies in addressing housing desegregation.
7 See infra note 46 for further discussion of common exclusion narratives with a
suburban cast.
8 The effect of futility narratives may be quite tangible. The conditions that gave rise
to the Mount Laurel Doctrine are by no means unique to New Jersey. As the experience
of the Doctrine's implementation is communicated in consistent futility narratives to interested parties, legislators, policymakers etc. in other states, the very idea of a constitutionally derived regional fair share obligation grows increasingly unattractive and impractical.
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tives discussed here might be called "massive resistance" on the one
hand and "abuse of power" on the other. The first relates to Mount Laurel's perceived futility in integrating predominantly white suburbs. The
second speaks to its perceived wrongheadedness in trying to bully
through centralized policy solutions without regard for local interests.
The ability of social science research, however, to unify the factual elements on which these and other narratives are based may considerably
clarify where the process needs to go from here.
The other goal of this essay is to view all of this against two larger

objectives that I have come to identify as the goals of the Mount Laurel
process. The first asks, is racial and economic integration possible in
New Jersey's white suburbs?9 One can easily argue that this is the central issue of Mount Laurel on the basis of the case opinions,' 0 commen-

tators" and the personal biases of people both threatened or helped by
Mount Laurel. Further, this is what Mount Laurel is all about primarily

because this is what exclusionary zoning, the practice against which the
original plaintiffs brought suit, is not about. Mount Laurel Township,
like townships across the land, through its zoning ordinances deliberately

erected barriers to building housing affordable to low-income households," a great many of whom it was presumed would be, and indeed
9 New Jersey does have predominantly non-white suburbs. For a brief discussion,
see, e.g., DouGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993), describing typical patterns of black suburbanization in older suburbs characterized by high population densities, low socioeconomic status and high indices of segregation from Whites.
30 Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 196, 336 A.2d 737 (Pashman, J., concurring) ("Many
people who settle in suburban areas do so with the specific intention of living in affluent,
socially homogenous communities and of escaping what they perceive to be the problems
of the cities"); see also Mount Laurel Its now storied footnote 5 at 92 N.J. at 210 n.5,
456 A.2d at 415-16 n.5 (citing Kerner Commission Report language decrying two societies, "one black, one white-separate and unequal ").
1 See, e.g., CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE:
RACE, SPACE, AND
AUDACIOUS JUDGES 9 (1996) (linking suburban integration of the poor with the need for
urban "deconcentration"); Rachel Fox, The Selling Out ofMount Laurel: Regional Contribution Agreements in New Jersey's Fair Housing Act, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 535,
543, 563 (1988) (describing Mount Laurel Doctrine's emphasis on racial integration as
"limited" and "implicit").
12 See Mount Laurel L 67 N.J. at 195, 336 A.2d at 736 (Pashman, J., concurring)
(describing exclusionary zoning as a "misuse" of municipal power involving, inter alia,
"the use of the zoning power by municipalities to maintain themselves as enclaves of affluence or of social homogeneity.") Justice Pashman specifically listed six zoning devices
routinely used to exclusionary effect, including minimum house size requirements; minimum lot and frontage size requirements; prohibitions on multifamily housing; restrictions
on the number of bedrooms; prohibitions on mobile homes; and overzoning for nonresidential uses. See id. at 197-209, 336 A.2d at 737-43. See generaly RICHARD F.
BABCOCK & FRED P. BossELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION IN
THE 1970s (1973); Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
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were, African American and Latino." The original litigation and the
thrust of several that followed was to undo the clear economic and de
facto racial discrimination resulting from exclusionary zoning practices.' 4
Thus, if a main objective of the Mount Laurel process was to facilitate
economic and racial integration of suburbia, then the Wish-Eisdorfer
study fills in some gaps and exposes others on the way to telling at least
one story about Mount Laurel's successes and failures.
A second question, however, grows out of the probable failure of
the first objective and asks, can a system of regionalized affordable
housing obligations create effective mechanisms for community economic
development in a state's central city neighborhoods? This objective reflects not only an appreciation for urban community ideals, but more importantly- and perhaps cynically-it assumes that there is formidable resiliency to the attitudes that produced exclusionary zoning and the Mount
Laurel litigation in the first place. 15 It also recognizes that much of the
subsequent Mount Laurel litigation dealt only indirectly with racial integration, and that the state legislation and related regulations that followed
were not always preoccupied with it either. 6 Instead, the urban economic development objective of Mount Laurel, if one can plausibly be
said to exist, would be rooted in meeting urban housing need. It is an
objective that is reflected in the idea of regional contribution agreements
Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969); Norman Williams, Jr.
& Thomas Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New
Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 476 (1971). See also Mount Laurel irs discussion of the
fundamental socioeconomic impact and motivation of typical zoning schemes. Rebutting
the Virginia Supreme Court majority in Weymouth, the New Jersey Supreme Court said,
"It would be ironic if inclusionary zoning to encourage the construction of lower income
housing were ruled beyond the power of a municipality because it is 'socioeconomic'
when its need has arisen from the socioeconomic zoning of the past that excluded it."
Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. 158, 272, 456 A.2d 390, 449.
13 See supra note 11.
14 However, the court expressly declined to view the litigation as a "race case" despite conferring standing on one of four categories of plaintiffs, including the NAACP,
who represented the "housing and other interests of racial minorities." Mount Laurel I,
67 N.J. at 159 n.3, 336 A.2d at 717 n.3. "We will, therefore, consider the case from the
wider viewpoint that the effect of Mount Laurel's land use regulation has been to prevent
various categories of persons from living in the township because of the limited extent of
their income and resources." Id. at 159, 336 A.2d at 717.
15 Commentators struggling with the historic inability to integrate white residential
areas amid the persistence of black inner-city poverty increasingly seek a balance of approaches. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-the-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1487 (1993) (arguing for the importance of both but tipping the scales toward community revitalization).
16 Indeed, nowhere in the language of the Act is there reference to considerations of
race or of the direct relevance in the implementation of its provisions. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-302 (West 1986) ("Legislative findings") or N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:27D-303 (West 1986) ("Legislative declarations and intention").
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(RCAs) 7 , and it arrived relatively late in the Mount Laurel process with

passage in 1985 of the state's Fair Housing Act (FHA). 1 1 Ultimately,
this objective nods to the Newarks and Camdens19 of the state as well as
the nation and is concerned with how the ghettoized poor will recall
Mount Laurel.
In the remainder of this essay, I will view each of these two objec-

tives through the lens of the Wish-Eisdorfer study and consider the relative plausibility of each narrative. In the first part, I will argue that, although the study's findings on the realistic possibility of suburban racial
and economic integration support a version of futility and persistent exclusion, what happens to that objective remains far .from clear. Social
science research does not yet fill enough gaps in our understanding of the
Mount Laurel process for it to fairly represent the failure of integration
or "mobility" strategies, and more research is therefore needed. I offer
the unsubstantiated suggestion that this objective of Mount Laurel was

significantly weakened in the administrative application, not the judicial
formulation, of the Mount Laurel Doctrine (the Doctrine).21 Undoubtedly, the results are troubling for the Doctrine. In the second part, however, I argue that inner-city economic revitalization became an unarticulated Mount Laurel objective at some later point in the process,
particularly through the enactment of the FHA; indeed, for a variety of
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996). Under the RCA,
a "sending municipality" may transfer up to 50% of its fair share obligation to a
"receiving municipality" pursuant to a voluntary agreement freely negotiated between the
municipalities and subject to the approval of COAH.
1s See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D - 301 et seq.
19According to the United States Bureau of the Census, 25% of Newark residents
and 35% of Camden residents had incomes below the federal poverty line in 1990.
m In their seminal study of racial segregation, American Apartheid, Douglas Massey
and Nancy Denton use a dissimilarity index to indicate the percentage of blacks in a given
city who would have to move out of predominantly black areas in order to achieve racial
balance. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 9. A value approaching 100 represents extreme racial segregation. In 1980, for households with incomes under $2500
(i.e., well below the federal poverty threshold), the dissimilarity index for blacks in Newark was 85.8. See id. at 86. In Detroit, a city with greater land mass as well as population, the corresponding figure was 88.6 in 1980. (Figures for more affluent blacks-i.e.,
those making more than $50,000 per year-were 77.5 and 86.4, respectively.) See id.
Massey and Denton define a ghetto as follows:
[A] ghetto is a set of neighborhoods that are exclusively inhabited by members of one group, within which virtually all members of that group live.
By this definition, no ethnic or racial group in the history of the United
States, except one, has ever experienced ghettoization, even briefly. For
urban blacks, the ghetto has been the paradigmatic residential configuration
for at least eighty years.
Id. at 19.
21 But see Holmes, supra note 5.
17
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mostly political reasons that became clearer as the Mount Laurel conflict
raged into its second decadeF the most realistic possibility of producing
needed affordable housing for at least low and moderate income people of
color in New Jersey would occur in the state's cities. Practitioners and
scholars both tend to view this development as the cynical compromise
that ultimately subverted the very meaning of Mount Laurel.' It may be.
Or it may be that, rather than trying to harmonize two apparently contradictory objectives as occupying the same ground, the ground itself may
have shifted during twenty-five years of border wars. Nevertheless, I argue that open acknowledgment of this often avoided Mount Laurel objective should stimulate focused social science research as a necessary means
to improving urban economic development strategies in the communities
where most low-income people of color live. Without more facts, an urban storyteller would be justified in concluding that even this objective of
Mount Laurel has failed to do more than build some units of more affordable housing.
I.

SHAME AT THE END OF THE RAINBOW

In Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court began its articulation of the "fair share" doctrine by requiring some suburban municipalities to plan for regional housing need by creating through their land
use regulations the realistic opportunity for "a variety and choice of
housing" affordable to low and moderate income residents.' The court's
recognition of exclusionary zoning as a social and economic evil was
nearly as bold as its appreciation of regional welfare. Legally and intellectually, the first Mount Laurel opinion affirmed notions of collective
responsibility under an expanded concept of the police power. As a subset of the state's police power on behalf of the general welfare, a municipality's delegated power to zone triggered obligations for regional welfare whenever its regulations had a "substantial external impact" beyond
its own borders.' Frustration of such obligations through the enactment
of zoning ordinances deemed exclusionary was a violation of the state
constitution. Eight years later, Mount Laurel 11 significantly clarified and
strengthened these obligations in the opinion we recognize as the Mount
Laurel Doctrine itself. In Mount Laurel II, the Court required more than
good faith efforts, but objective proof of progress toward meeting a specific fair share obligation.'
Further, it expanded the "builder's rem2

See generally HAAR, supra note 11.

2

See infra note 76.

24 See Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. 151, 174, 336 A.2d 713, 724-25 (1975).

2' See id. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726.
2
See Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. 158, 220-21, 456 A.2d 390, 421 (1983).
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edy "27 as a market-driven tool of enforcement and streamlined the process for future litigation by creating a three-judge Mount Laurel "bar"'
and promoting the innovative use of special masters.'
A. Economic Integrationof the Suburbs
If the objective of the Mount Laurel process became the economic
and racial integration of New Jersey's suburbs, then the Wish-Eisdorfer
study's findings are clearly problematic." As to economic integration,
we learn that households with severe unmet housing need are "wellrepresented" in the Affordable Housing Management Service (AHMS)
applicant pool, but that low-income and large households are underrepresented.31 At first blush the findings seem somewhat encouraging yet unclear, because it is tempting to correlate low incomes with severe unmet
housing need. However, when you add the finding that the New Jersey
Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) regulations establish a regime in
which mainly moderate income households are targeted, followed by
households at the top of the low-income range,' the somewhat murky
picture of qualified success becomes clearer. The poor, especially the
very poor, simply were not targeted." Thus, it should come as no surprise that they are underrepresented among beneficiaries. The research
demonstrates that we have some economic integration, but not a lot and it
is by no means radical.
Similarly, the findings show that there was little change across the
urban-suburban boundary. Only 15% of previously urban households
moved to suburbia. 4 "Outsiders" hardly penetrated the suburbs.' Sub27 See id. at 279, 336 A.2d at 452.

'9 See id. at 292-93, 336 A.2d at 459.
29 See id. at 281-82, 336 A.2d at 453.
30 Many of the Wish-Eisdorfer findings build on and duplicate a study performed in

1988 by Martha Lamar, John Payne and Alan Mallach of Rutgers University. The results
of the so-called "Rutgers Study" of Mount Laurel housing may be found in Martha Lamar et al., Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable Housing in New Jersey, 1983-1988, 41
RUTGERS L. REv. 1197 (1989). See also John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary
Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Making the Theory t the Facts, 20 VT. L.
REv. 665, 669-70 (1996) (summarizing Rutgers Study findings as well as those by Robert
Fitzpatrick in a 1993 study for the New Jersey Dep't of Community Affairs entitled, The
Math of Mount Laurel).
31 See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 1, at 68.
See id.
33 According to the study, AHMS staff counsel found that very low income applicant
3

households are unlikely to afford AHMS housing without additional housing or income
subsidies. "The effect of this policy is to reduce the number of very low income households in the AHMS applicant database." Id. at 30.
3 See id. at 69.
See id.; Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. 158, 209, 456 A.2d 390, 415 (1983).
3
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urban applicants simply relocated within suburbs.' This represents a
sort of stasis.3 '
It is worth stopping here to recall why economic integration of the
suburbs is considered a good at all. As the United States becomes a nation in which a plurality of its population now lives in suburbs,38 what
began decades ago as a combination of white flight and the desire for
pastoral quality of life elements is now the norm. That is, living in suburbs is defining the residential character of middle-class life itself. More
than just an economic fact or a political fact,39 this demographic shift may
represent a fact about identity. But for our immediate purposes, it is the
economic fact of suburban life that makes it a paramount good and fuels
the push for suburban integration.' The suburbs are now home to the
See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 1, at 69-73.
37 This static result was not without its prophets.
36

In a review of Mount Laurel 11
(following an earlier Mount Laurel symposium at Seton Hall School of Law), Robert
Holmes cited demographic statistics demonstrating that, using the court's income guidelines alone, whites could benefit from construction of new Mount Laurel units at a ratio of
3.1:1 over blacks. See Holmes, supra note 5, at 950. "One could speculate from these
demographic data that selection criteria left unmonitored could result in apparent significant success for the Mount Laurel mandate without accommodating a single black family." Id. Holmes argued that the essential flaw in the court's ruling was its deliberate
failure to recognize the racial dimension of the plaintiffs' claims. See id. at 944-45. By
characterizing the general welfare in class terms, rather than explicitly including race, the
court left the doctrine open to unintended racial consequences.
Therefore, unless other criteria for reaching the protected class are advanced [lowincome black home seekers without significant assets], facially neutral selection criteria
which, when applied to applicants for "Mount Laurel" housing tend to upset the ratios set
forth above, should be regarded as suspect and rejected as constitutionally impermissible.
Id. at 951.
Holmes, however, did not object to housing preferences for poor applicants residing
near new housing. See id. As the Wish-Eisdorfer study suggests, the use of such locational preferences may be a primary contributing factor to the persistent segregation. See
VISH & EISDORFER, supra note 1, at 73.
3 See HAAR, supra note 11, at 4. See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS
FRONTIERS (1985).
3
See Thomas B. Edsall, Republicans Showed Muscle in Holding onto House; Some
Anaysts Say GOP Edge is Long Term, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1996, at A8 (discussing
Republican victory in 1996 House elections and narrowing Democratic political base in
large cities); Richard Louv, Soccer Moms? Political Stereotypes Miss the Mark, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 6, 1996, at A5 ("[The 1996 presidential election was] the first
election in U.S. history in which a majority of voters live[d] in the suburbs.... "); Karen
DeWitt, Suburbs, Especially in the South, are Becoming the Source of PoliticalPower in
the U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1994, at A9 (identifying suburbs as key to political power
and source of increasing Republican dominance in coming years).
4D Such economic facts were well known to the New Jersey Supreme Court in the articulation of the Mount Laurel Doctrine. See, e.g., Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. 151, 172,
336 A.2d 713, 723 (1975) (noting the incongruity of developing municipalities wooing
industry while passing zoning ordinances that prevent lower paid employees from living
there). See also Mount Laurel I, 92 N.J. 158, 210-11 n.5, 456 A.2d 390, 415-17 n.5
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economic investment that has abandoned cities, 41 especially inner cities.
In an aspirational narrative spoken not so much by the urban poor but by
some of their policy defenders, poor people of color need to move
there.42 From corporate parks to back-office facilities, manufacturing to
service sector employment, retail stores and public services, safe streets
and open space, inclusion in America increasingly demands residence in
suburbia.' Perhaps nowhere is this profile of American life, present and
future, better demonstrated than in the state of New Jersey, one of the
most suburban states in the country."
To linger here for another moment, a finding of modest economic
integration appears to reflect a pattern of compromises between the law
and its application. The original Mount Laurel litigation assumed the
right of lower-income people not to be excluded, if not affirmatively in-

cluded, from the variety of social and economic benefits that accrue simply by virtue of residency in middle-class suburban areas.45 The response
(1983) (suggesting that the availability of low-income housing may create job opportunities for poor unemployed workers).
41 See HAAR, supra note 11, at 5; DAVID RUSK, CrTES WITHOUT SUBURBS 5-7 (1993);
Sue Kirchoff, Suburbs Play Role in Success of U.S. Welfare Reform, REUTERS N. AMER.
WIRE, Oct. 17, 1996 (identifying the suburbs as source of two-thirds of new jobs created
during the 1980s).
42 This is idea is sometimes responsible for characterizing efforts to move the urban
poor to thriving suburbs as "mobility" strategies, rather than integration. "Mobility" becomes shorthand for economic mobility similar to the historic migrations of groups in the
United States toward areas of greater employment opportunities. The term is considered
more descriptive of the strategy's objectives without suffering from the misdescription of
"integration," which under such scenarios is frequently one way. See, e.g., Florence
Wagman Roisman & Hilary Botein, Housing Mobility and Life Opportunities, 27
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 335 (1993) (discussing both resident-based and unit-based housing
mobility programs across the nation).
43 For a concise listing of some of the specific public and private "goods" traditionally associated with suburban membership, see Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on lnclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at Its Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539, 567
(1995)(quoting ANTHONY DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR
AMERICA 26 (1973)).
4 See, e.g., KIRP ET AL, supra note 6, at 23 ("That is another way of saying that it is
the most municipally fragmented state in the nation.").
4 See, e.g., Mount Laurel 11,92 N.J. 158, 209, 456 A.2d 390, 415 (1983), in which
the New Jersey Supreme Court, in setting forth the constitutional underpinnings of the
fair share idea, expresses the inclusion ideal as participation in place-based benefits that
presumably exist (at least in New Jersey) outside of cities. Thus, the court found the municipal obligation to zone poor residents into upper-income areas in the state's effective
control of the use of land. "The government that controls this land represents everyone.
While the state may not have the ability to eliminate poverty, it cannot use that condition
as a basis for imposing further disadvantages." id., 456 A.2d at 415.
Interestingly, the Court goes on to "imagine" the situation that would obtain in the
absence of such a state obligation:
[Ploor people forever zoned out of substantial areas of the state, not because housing could not be built for them but because they are not wanted;
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from middle-class suburban residents was to regard such a prospect as an
invasion and a certain corruption of cherished rights associated with middle-class membership.' Initially, the law was unsympathetic to middleclass antipathy to undesirables, but, as the research now demonstrates,
the application of the law-primarily through COAH47 and AHMSworked a compromise.
poor people forced to live in urban slums forever not because suburbia,
developing rural areas, fully developed residential sections, seashore resorts, and other attractive locations could not accommodate them, but simple because they are not wanted. It is a vision not only at variance with the
requirement that the zoning power be used for the general welfare but with
all concepts of fundamental fairness and decency that underpin many constitutional obligations.
Id. at 209-10, 456 A.2d at 415. As further noted by the Court in reference to Newark
and Camden, however, it is a vision which closely resembles reality for the bulk of New
Jersey's urban poor. See id. at 210-11 n.5, 456 A.2d at 415-17.
For a brief discussion of the related notion of whiteness as a property right, see infra
note 52.
4
Despite a common, almost predictable ring, suburban narratives of exclusion invoke a complicated set of assumptions about membership and the rationales justifying use
of authority to exclude others. For example, in Westchester County, across the Hudson
River from New Jersey, the Village of Mount Kisco has sought to intensify efforts to exclude the growing numbers of mainly Central American residents who have come first as
day laborers. The day laborers live in overcrowded rental apartments and subdivided
homes, sometimes in violation of housing code provisions typically designed to protect
poor tenants. Mount Kisco police have recently started late-night raids in which Hispanic
residents are photographed in their homes, ordered to remove belongings and taken to
shelters. Hispanic advocates call it official harassment, and cite to several other examples
since the Hispanic population increased from 5% in 1980 to 12% in 1990. But the narrative from resident decision makers in the town is instructive. In the words of Martin
McGrath, a longtime member of the Mount Kisco Planning Board, enforcement of local
ordinances against the influx of Hispanics is a matter of the fair allocation of taxpayer
burdens. "The more you move into the village proper, you see the people sitting on the
benches. You see them walking around the village. You know they're not Mount Kisco
people. They're Hispanic. We don't have that many in town. Remember one thing[.J
We're all in good faith. We have our Christian image. Everyone's a human being. But I
don't see that that gives them the right to overburden our facilities: water, sewage, garbage." Celia W. Dugger, Immigrants and Suburbia Square Off, Hispanic Residents of
Mount Kisco Say They're Being Harassed,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at A47.
47 Under the state's Fair Housing Act, COAH has the power to (1) define the state's
housing regions; (2) estimate present and prospective need for low and moderate income
housing; (3) adopt guidelines by which municipalities determine their fair share of regional housing need and methods of adjusting the fair share; (4) provide population and
housing projections; and (5) limit the total number of units a given municipality is required to build. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307 (West 1986).
Some commentators have argued that various provisions of the Act, but especially
the combination of COAH's regulatory power and administrative role effect a lessening of
the original burden the court put on municipalities, a result effectively endorsed by the
court itself in Mount Laurel 111, 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986). As Professor Haar
stated, "[B]y the very creation of a new administrative agency, by specifying formulas
that would allow exceptions from the fair share allocation developed by the trial courts,
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Unfortunately, the research does not tell us why. It does not yet examine how the definitions of affordability in the regulations 4 could, in
practice, yield such an underrepresentation of low-income families. Although suggesting they are a cause, the research does not yet describe the
process by which those affordability thresholds were actually administered or, for that matter, monitored. It leaves tremendous room to
speculate as to why penetration by urban outsiders was so mild and
minimal.
Here again, social science research should guide our understanding
of cultural, political and psychological resistance to new compositions of
community. Narratives at the heart of social and economic conflict often
diverge on the level of attitudes, normative beliefs, and psychic needs.
The law's long history of inadequacy in explaining, let alone remedying,
these important dimensions of societal rupture is especially evident in the
Mount Laurel process. For all of the overreaching that critics of the New
Jersey Supreme Court alleged it had undertaken in formulating the Mount
Laurel Doctrine, the Court rarely went into detail about the underlying
psycho-social forces at work in preventing economic integration of the
suburbs through exclusionary zoning and other means. To do so within
its major opinions as well as in the aftermath, as Professor Haar argues, 9
might have engaged the populace in a deeper debate about the values at
risk and at stake in Mount Laurel and strengthened public perceptions of
the court's authority along the way. However, where the court went
quiet the New Jersey legislature went completely dumb. The FHA
speaks not at all to the psycho-social dimensions of Mount Laurel. Although this is nothing new to legislative drafting, such silence helps explain the apparent futility of the Act in reversing old patterns of economic
exclusion while contributing to the divergent free for all of narrative
meanings given Mount Laurel. Empirical social science research on
subjects such as specific suburban attitudes toward inclusion, the role of
public representative bodies in safeguarding private interests, distinctions
between attitude sets of suburban residents of old wealth and those of
relatively new, as well as perceptions about suburban life among innercity residents would better help us to understand both the nature of re-

by ordering a moratorium on the builder's remedy, and by adding the regional contribution agreement as an acceptable compliance mechanism, the FHA can be read as a direct
blow to the courts." HAAR, supra note 11, at 95-96.
48 See N.J. STAT. §52:27D-304 (1996); cf. N.J. STAT. § 40A:12A-3 (1996); see also
Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 222, n.8, 456 A.2d at 422, n.8.
49 See HAAR, supra note 11, at 162-64.
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sistance to and the possibilities for suburban economic integration by
closing significant gaps in our understandings.'
B.

Racial Integration of the Suburbs

As to racial integration of the suburbs, the study uncovers a new
minimum. The vast majority of white applicants were suburban and they

stayed there; two-thirds of white applicants who were urban actually left
a city to become suburban too.5" On the other hand, the vast majority of
black applicants were urban, and only 5% moved to suburbs."2 The same
was true of Latinos, among whom a mere 2% moved to suburbia. 3 A
significant number of suburban blacks even left suburbia for urban
housing.' Consequently, suburban households are 81% White, accord-

-1 The call for more extensive social and psychological research into the public attitudes, particularly of suburban whites, about economic (and racial) integration should be
limited as much as possible to New Jersey and distinguished from some very interesting
and important legal scholarship on the subject of whiteness as a property interest. Indeed, the first qualifier modifies the latter. I am arguing that a full understanding of exclusionary resistance in New Jersey in spite of Mount Laurel cannot be had without more
detailed, systematic understanding of local attitudes, their content, references and dynamics in the state's peculiar culture.
The contributions made by legal theorists who posit the existence of a perceived
property right in whiteness itself go a long way in helping us to understand what may in
fact be material manifestations of processes in the collective unconscious of white communities. The property rights in whiteness, these authors argue, range from the individual and personal to the collective and structural. Examples of the former include daily
expectations of being perceived as competent in job settings or enjoying the very presumption of individuality rather than as a member of a group. In the latter, white neighborhoods are perceived as synonymous with being positive and valuable, thereby influencing actual property values through appraisal patterns. Overall, these property rights
are enjoyed through a majoritarian transparency, which renders normal and invisible the
privileges that accompany white exclusivity. See generally, Derrick Bell, Xerces and the
Affwmative Action Mystique, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1595 (1989); Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1709 (1993); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How
Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to
Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1596, 1636-48 (1995); Ian F. Haney
Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,
and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation,
Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1659 (1995). Compelling though
they are, these assertions are not often based on empirical social science data drawn from
specific populations and hence they are subject to the same critique of being overly
speculative as any other narrative, or at least misdescriptive of a particular population. It
is entirely possible, however, that the research I am calling for here might confirm many
of the theoretical assertions about the importance of protecting whiteness as property.
51 See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 1, at 70.
S2 See id.
5 See id.
S4 See id.

1484

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:1471

ing to the study, and urban households are 85% Black. 5 The pattern is
unmistakable and again represents a sort of stasis.
Perhaps the final nail in the coffin containing Mount Laurel's ideals
is a finding which combines race, class, and space: Black and Latino
low-income applicants for suburban Mount Laurel housing were turned
down at a significantly higher rate than their white counterparts. This is
a measure of occupancy, and it requires special emphasis. For instance,
moderate-income black applicants were almost twice as likely to actually
occupy a unit than a low-income black applicant.' The same disparity
for Latinos jumped to four-fold."' However, the success ratios for lowand moderate-income white applicants and occupants are the same.'
These incongruities might somehow be explained by the differences in
requirements for sales rather than rental housing. More sales than rental
housing would presumably be available in suburban areas, and credit
histories and the need for downpayments could theoretically disadvantage
Black and Latino applicants relative to whites, even of similar incomes.
But the study finds otherwise, compounding the mystery. Indeed, among
low-income occupants, most live in rental units located in urban areas.5
Yet while 88% of low-income black tenants and 84% of Latinos remain
in cities, only 6% of low-income whites live in urban rental units.' The
overwhelming majority of the latter group who occupy Mount Laurel
rental housing resides in the suburbs.61 Clearly something is very much
amiss.6

See id.
6 See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 1, at 58.
57 See id. at 59.

s See id. at 58.
See id. at 60.
60 See id.
61 See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 1, at 60.
62 The study speculates that "[tlhese disparities may also indicate that something in
the application, screening, purchase or rental process inhibits or impedes minorities from
acquiring low income housing in general." Id. at 59. While such factors undoubtedly
contribute, a global explanation about how and why applicants receive the information
about Mount Laurel housing seems more compelling. Being the most segregated from
mainstream information networks, poor blacks and Latinos are in the worst position to
learn of available low-income housing, let alone the requirements for obtaining it under
competitive conditions. See infra note 70. Moreover, the private marketing system by
which most Mount Laurel housing reaches the public helps to guarantee that suburban
housing remains predominantly white. Developers who market their housing have little
incentive to seek out distant applicants with unpopular demographic profiles. Thus, black
and Latino applicants remain excluded from suburbia because they have little or no access
to the private "market" for Mount Laurel housing there. (I must cede most of the credit
for this point to my colleague, Prof. John Payne.)

1997]

MOUNT LAUREL & URBAN POSSIBILITY

1485

C. Resulting Narratives of Futility
One could tell this as the story of this generation's massive resistance.' In this narrative, mild economic integration is simply code for
whites only, albeit moderate-income whites. The mythology of the
city-black, Latino, impoverished, infested and thoroughly despised as a
place and as a symbol of its inhabitants-goes pretty much unchanged.
White homeowner association attitudes, well organized behind political
lobbyists able to assert their interests with receptive elected officials, did
not change. This resistance represents an ongoing crisis in race and ethnic relations. Attempts to take suburban residents beyond individual considerations in order to promote collective, regionalized identities have not
caught on; the only community they recognize beyond their own is the
city, and it is simply demonized. Mount Laurel did not work, and the
stamina and will to try again were drained by a brutal twenty-five year
process. This, of course, is the narrative from the perspective of promoting racial and economic diversity in suburbia. The study provides the
facts, according to this view, and the facts show that Mount Laurel was a
monumental failure.
Yet even an abuse-of-power narrative, one in opposition to the massive resistance story and suspicious of racial and economic integration of
suburbia, could begin with the assertion that Mount Laurel was a monumental failure-as well as a costly one. " Like the failed War on Poverty, so this narrative goes, social engineering by policymaking elite attempt to bully change without dealing with root causes. These include
rampant crime, poverty, and poor education in cities that are not the responsibility of suburban residents to fix. The judges were wrong in trying to redistribute social goods in such an undemocratic fashion (so
power was rightfully returned to the legislative branch). To the extent
that Mount Laurel relied on non-redistributive remedies-i.e., market
forces-the results show that it has achieved its aims without disrupting
the fabric of communities. But at undue cost, which should not be
wasted again.
3 The historical term "massive resistance" refers to the efforts of Southern leaders,
particularly governors, to defy school desegregation requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Despite such official
opposition, the Court hoped to reinforce its order to desegregate in Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
64 Preoccupation with "costs" appears to be a hallmark of many dominant narratives
with respect to resource sharing and economic inequality. See, e.g., infra note 48.
Costs, however, are closely associated with values, both social and economic. Thus,
through the subtle use of innocuous terms, dominant narratives can achieve a covert dichotomy where suburbs are understood as places of good and inner cities as bad. See
infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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Fortunately, there is a problem with either version of events and
their meanings that social science can help to resolve in the future. That
racial and economic prejudice continued to infect the process is undeniable. But we do not really know at what junctures such prejudice was
able to weaken the resolve against it or to subvert a scheme of inclusion.
The Wish-Eisdorfer study suggests that many households of color were
priced out of housing that whites were able to afford.' But the findings
are not conclusive, only suggestive. The study further suggests that the
practice of giving preference for housing in a region to applicants who
work or/and live in that same region may have inadvertently locked in
already segregated housing patterns.' In that sense, households of color
were largely "placed out" of suburban units. But so far we cannot say
for sure. Much more importantly, we really do not know how applicants
got information about housing in each of the six regions or on a town-bytown basis.67 This information is critical, because we could learn that inadequate information and marketing-a hallmark of poverty status in this
country"-simply prevented people from learning of housing for which
they were eligible. On the other hand, if we learn that they knew and
were eligible but declined the housing, research rather than speculation
about cultural tendencies and the neutral operation of markets should tell
us why. We just do not have the whole story about how specific applicants in the Mount Laurel placement process found their way. Until we
have such information, we would be wise to refrain from general condemnations of integration strategies and from conclusions that Mount
Laurel was a failure. The answer may be that we do not yet know because we have not yet tried.
Finding out is critical, because the failure to integrate New Jersey's
areas of greatest economic vitality would represent more than a missed
opportunity for the fulfillment of moral aspirations. The imperatives that
6 See, e.g., WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 1, at 72 ("The fact that COAH pricing
regulations in effect during the relevant period essentially targeted moderate income
housing at various levels in the moderate income range, but only at the very top of the
low income range-i.e., households at or very near the upper limit of 50 percent of the

median household income-may have exacerbated disparities.")
6 See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 1, at 27 & 73.
67 The study speaks to this concern in noting, for example, that some projects are advertised primarily, if not exclusively, by developers, and "the location and characteristics
of applicants may by the extent and nature of the advertising." See id. at 28-29. However, the study is not sufficiently specific in describing this and other means by which
applicants receive notice of available housing through AHMS or, for that matter, other
relevant sources.
68 See WILLIAM Juuus WiLsoN, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE

UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC PoucY 55-62 (1987) (describing how a product of the social
transformation in the concentration of very poor families in neighborhoods with high
jobless rates is social isolation from information, specifically job, networks).
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moved the New Jersey Supreme Court in Mount Laurel I and II were at
least economic and moral.' Yet together these motive forces encompass
a necessary benefit that integration has always implied: the breakdown of
a self-legitimating social hierarchy based on race by which both privilege
and exclusion are systematized. The prospect of Mount Laurel's failure
as an instrument of de-segregation would validate social constructions of
value in the state whereby white suburbs are understood in the dominant
narrative as being good and normal, while black cities are bad and aberrant.' As one thoughtful scholar has observed, "[bireaking down the
walls of exclusion therefore has the effect of breaking down white dominance as well as making white spaces less white.""1
II.
A.

MOUNT LAUREL AND URBAN POSSIBILITY

Community Economic Development

A corollary to suburban impossibility is urban possibility. On its
face, the Mount Laurel Doctrine, a contemporary regional integration
scheme, may not appear susceptible of intra-urban interpretation. Indeed,
the promotion of urban deconcentration would seem inconsistent with urban revitalization, and the latter was never openly embraced by the New
Jersey Supreme Court. Perhaps for that reason, the Wish-Eisdorfer study
is silent in demonstrating whether the Doctrine has succeeded at all in
what I identify as the second Mount Laurel objective, aiding the revitalization of central city neighborhoods through Mount Laurel's creation of
regionalized housing obligations. It would have been well beyond the
scope of the research, but it is critical research nonetheless. Because at
some point in the compromise process between the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decisions and the application of the law, the interests of the
state's cities were brought into the mix.' The principal mechanism is the
69 See, e.g., Mount Laurel , 67 N.J. 151, 221, 336 A.2d 713, 749 (1975) ("Just as
diversity strengthens and enriches the country as a whole, so will it strengthen and enrich
a suburban community.") (Pashman, J., concurring). It is harder to ascertain the legislature's motives behind passage of the FHA, although the Act's preamble includes some
of the New Jersey Supreme Court's Mount Laurel language.
1 See RUSK, supra note 43, 29 (briefly dichotomizing white suburbs as "good" and
black inner cities as "bad").
71 Mahoney, supra note 52, at 1680 (emphasis supplied). See also Calmore, supra
note 15, at 1271-73.
7 See, e.g., In re Township of Warren, 247 N.J. Super. 146, 164, 588 A.2d 1227,
1236 (App. Div. 1991).
Harold McDougall has argued that the Mount Laurel Doctrine has taken explicit account of cities since at least the Mount Laurel HI opinion. See generally Harold McDougall, Mount Laurel II and the Revitalizing City, 15 RUTGERs L.J. 667 (1984). Specifically, Professor McDougall favorably viewed the court's refusal to exclude large cities
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RCA by which, in theory, cities benefit financially from the continued
resistance of predominantly white suburbs to the in-migration of city
residents.' Whatever one may think of this process of bargaining away a
legal and perhaps social obligation, 4 it has funded new affordable hous-

from "developing municipality" obligations as a clear signal that the court foresaw the
Doctrine's application as a possible tool of urban revitalization. See id. at 668, 675-78.
The principal mechanism for building housing in the state's larger municipalities would be
inclusionary zoning measures mentioned by the court, such as set-asides and density bonuses, rather than RCAs (which would not arrive for another decade). See id. at 683-91.
The principal danger presented by the court's endorsement of inclusionary zoning, however, was the displacement of poor residents through resulting gentrification. See id. at
678-83.
73 Prior to the adoption of a rule prohibiting transfer of any fair share obligation for
less than $20,000 per unit, Douglas Opalski found that by March 1992 RCAs had resulted in the transfer of $60 million from suburban to urban areas for the rehabilitation of
about 2500 units and the construction of 700 new units.
The bargaining practice has created its own market with its own bidding wars. For
example, the City of Newark had negotiated an RCA with Parsippany-Troy Hills in which
the latter would pay $6.6 million for a total of 294 new and rehabilitated units. The suburb reneged when it was able to strike the same deal with the City of Elizabeth for only
$5.1 million. See HAAR, supra note 11, at 215. The RCA market mechanism clearly
relies on what could be regarded as internecine counterbidding among the poorest cities
in the state. See Fox, supra note 11, at 569 nn.133-136 & 559 n.98.
74 Professor Haar has argued that, despite the apparent repudiation of the Mount Laurel Doctrine's explicit suburban integration objective, the RCAs reflect a necessary compromise between the courts and the legislature.
[W]ithout a mechanism like the RCA, one has to wonder whether the legislature would have enacted any statute that supported the production of
low- and moderate-income housing in suburban areas. So perceived,
RCAs appear as a safety valve to a doctrine of integration so potentially
disruptive of perceived local prerogatives that the entire ship of low-income
housing production could sink without such a concession. RCAs allow a
move in the right direction after all, just at a slower, more politically realistic pace.
HAAR, supra note 11, at 113-14.
Nevertheless, Haar recognizes that RCAs marked the formal transition between the
racial and economic integration objective of Mount Laurel and what I optimistically suggest is the start of the community economic development objective. "By dint of the legislation, the option of buying out of the affordable housing obligation displaced the goal of
integration and population redistribution." Id. at 114.
Others have been less sanguine. Professor McDougall argues that the RCA scheme
encourages suburban municipalities to make the "rational" decision to transfer fair share
units while receiving cities make "desperate" ones to enter such agreements. See Harold
A. McDougall, Compensationfor Exclusionary Zoning, 60 TEMP. L. Q. 665, 689. The
transaction showcases the unequal bargaining power between the two. See id. at 681-84.
Cities simply have little choice but to seek out additional sources of financing. Unfortunately for cities, revenues from RCAs do not cover many of the costs associated with
housing development, such as cost overruns, occupant preparation, and post-development
costs. See id. at 687-88; see also, Fox, supra note 11, at 565-572 (criticizing RCAs as a
substantive retreat from the Doctrine's terms as well as pointing specifically to the problems of unregulated bidding among cities and the potential for misuse of funds)

19971

MOUNT LAUREL & URBAN POSSIBILITY

ing in the state's cities.

5

1489

This is an explicit objective of community eco-

nomic development, and, at some point, it became an implicit objective
of Mount Laurel.
The term community economic development needs clarification because it has come to mean so many things in so many different quarters.

The use of the word "community" before the term economic development has served to distinguish the concept from, say, downtown development of business corridors; "community" therefore connotes low income, usually people of color and, until fairly recently, involving the
work of non-profit organizations. Much of the work of these communitybased nonprofit organizations has focused on developing or rehabilitating
affordable housing, and has required little emphasis in law. Hence, the
pioneers of contemporary community economic development tend to be
non-profit community development corporations (CDCs), which have
gained expertise in housing development by working with, and leveraging
resources from, public and private institutions, such as the Ford Foundation's Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), a national intermediary that raises capital for local projects by providing housing tax credits.
Housing-centered work has expanded somewhat to additional needs in
low-income neighborhoods. As the network of social services-oriented
organizations and advocates has branched out beyond housing, umbrella
groups with distinct legal expertise, such as the National Economic Development and Law Center76 in Oakland, California, and a variety of Legal Services Corporation offices, have come to play important roles in
providing tax and other legal advice.
The greatest challenge to the different disciplines involved in the
work of rebuilding economically abandoned, urban communities has been
creating jobs, especially through a substantial increase in capital investment. The other term commonly associated with community economic
development, "empowerment," is often used to reflect this critical aspect
of neighborhood revitalization. The dual emphasis on jobs and housing
is expressed in both public and private models of community economic
development, from the Clinton Administration's passage of empowerment

75 As of February 1995, COAH had approved 39 RCAs around the state by which a
total of almost $81 million and 4172 units had been transferred from suburbs to cities.
See HAAR, supra note 11, at 115. Overall, the price per unit has ranged from a low of
$11,500 (paid by Hamilton to Trenton) to $27,500 (paid by Hopewell to Trenton and by
Franklin to Perth Amboy). See id. at 233. Newark has led the way with six RCAs,
transferring 732 units at an average price of $18,335 per unit. See id.
76 See NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LAW CENTER,
GANIZATIONS IN COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1995).

COUNSELUNG OR-
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zone legislation' to fully decentralized, grass roots "buy black" campaigns that involve complicated assumptions of the cultural and economic
benefits that might flow from "recycled dollars" within ethnically and

economically homogenous neighborhoods.'

In between lie many other

models designed to bring economic vitality and social stability to neighborhoods of intense poverty, large-scale economic disinvestment and political marginalization.' Finally, advocacy organizations concerned with

racial and economic discrimination against entire urban communities also
do the work of community economic development by, for example,
bringing Community Reinvestment Act protests against banks that shirk
investment, lending and retail services in low-income areas of the metropolitan regions in which they do business.'
More recently, commentators and policymakers have come to appreciate the importance of giving
equal weight to long-existing social service concerns in community economic development strategies,"1 thereby rejecting the either-or ethos
(investment or people) that has dominated policy debates for so long.
77 See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66 §§ 13301-13303, 107
Stat. 312, 543 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1394, 1396, 1397 (1993)).
78 See generally TIMOTHY BATES, BANING ON BLACK ENTERPRISE 31-72 (1993);
Jeremiah Cotton, Towards a Theory and Strategy for Black Economic Development, in
RACE, POLTCS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, (James Jennings ed., 1992); Michael
Mitchell, Harlem's Economic Paradox, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1995 (discussing "buy
black" sentiments at the root of fatal fire and commercial landlord dispute on Harlem's
125th Street shopping strip).
79 See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City (Nov.
1, 1994) (unpublished draft on file with the author) (discussing myriad failures of traditional social advocacy approaches to neighborhood revitalization and arguing instead for
new strategies utilizing free market approaches such as industry "clustering" and both
indigenous and regional advantages); DAVID F. BEATMY ET AL., REDEVELOPMENT IN
CALIFORNIA 25-64 (2d ed. 1995) (describing adoption and implementation of redevelopment plans under California's Redevelopment Law).
8o The Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-22907 (1988), imposes
lending and other service obligations on banks as a condition of their federal charter. Its
uneven use as an advocacy tool for redlined low-income communities has been the subjeet of substantial scholarly attention. See Gary M. Swidler, Note, Making the Community Reinvestment Act Work, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387 (1994); Anthony D. Taibi, Banking,
Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive RacialJustice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1994).
Redlining is not limited to disinvestment by banks. In communities where residents
are largely dependent on cars, such as many parts of California, redlining by automobile
insurance companies has had devastating effects on the economic opportunities available
to consumers. See, e.g., City of Compton v. Bunner, 197 Cal. App.3d 617 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988) (challenging California's insurance law on state equal protection grounds);
Gary Williams, The Wrong Side of the Tracks: TerritorialRating and the Setting of
Automobile Liability Insurance Rates in California, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845
(1992).
s1 See, e.g., Peter R. Pitegoff, Urban Revitalization and Community Finance: An Introduction, 27 MICH. J. L. REFORM 613, 617-25 (1994) (overview discussing policies that
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What emerges from this tangle of threads is that community economic development is, and must be viewed, in comprehensive ways. It is
the sum of its many parts-housing, lending, food, public services, and
institutions, health care, etc.-and more. Ultimately, community economic development combines the work of building and investing with
healing and participating. To succeed, it will require jointly harnessing a
volatile dynamic of tangible and intangible, individual and collective, local and regional, public and private, for-profit and non-profit, all against
a background of intense poverty and historic and contemporary discrimination.
The relationship of this dynamic to the Mount Laurel process is, I
hope, growing clearer. As noted, community economic development
strategies often begin with affordable housing and branch out to include
improved municipal services,' 2 better access to essential consumer goods
and services' and, most importantly, proximity to jobs." These are precisely the benefits of a robust economic infrastructure that many lowincome people of color and their advocates expected to gain by suburban
residency under the Doctrine.' Instead, the affordable housing element
combine social goals with housing and credit financing methods); Susan Fainstein & Ann
Markusen, The Urban Policy Challenge: Integrating Across Social and Economic Development Policy, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1463, 1468-82 (1993).
In fact, one of the distinguishing factors between the Clinton Administration's empowerment zone legislation and enterprise zone proposals submitted by Jack Kemp and
others during the preceding administration is the emphasis on social service needs. In
addition to the familiar tax incentives to business investors and employers, the former
provides, inter alia, millions of dollars in Title XX Social Security Bloc Grants. 24
C.F.R. § 597.200(d)(12)(i)(A)-(C) (1994). For a brief comparison of the major provisions, see Ellen P. April, Caution: EnterprizeZones, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1993).
82 Several economic development strategies have included equality of municipal
services litigation. See e.g., Baugh v. City of Milwaukee, 823 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. Wis.
1993) (fire inspections); Ammons v. City of Dade, 594 F. Supp. 1274 (M.D. Fla. 1984)
(sewage and stree repaving). See generally Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color,
77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 779-82 (1993).
83 See e.g., DAVID D. TRoUTr, THE THIN RED LINE: How THE POOR S'II.L PAY MoRE
(1993) (comparing the infrastructure of basic goods and services in low- and middleincome neighborhoods of Oakland and Los Angeles, California).
84 These rationales underlie the Clinton Administration's "Moving to Opportunity
Demonstration Program" whereby residents of areas of concentrated poverty qualify for
Section 8 housing certificates as well as housing counseling from nonprofit organizations.
Under the program, residents seek housing in middle class, predominantly suburban settings. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 § 152, Pub. L. No. 102550, 106 Stat. 3762 (1992) and related regulations at 58 Fed. Reg. 43,458 (1993). See
also Roisman, Housing Mobility and Life Opportunities,supra note 44.
85 The urban economic development objective is foreshadowed at several junctures in
the Mount Laurel saga, including early references to the meaning of economic integration
contained in the first litigation. At oral argument in Mount Laurel I, for example, Justice
Hall responded to a township attorney's denial that Mount Laurel has any responsibility
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of the Doctrine has been turned back to the cities in which they live
through the mechanism of the RCA, launching a new set of burning
questions, such as: Do those contributions facilitate sustainable economic
development of those inner-city neighborhoods? What evidence do we
have so far? What exactly is the proximity of such housing to available

employment, and to what extent do residents actually find sustained employment there? What's missing? Should the RCA rules be amended to
require the contributing municipality to do more, both in terms of covering additional but typical housing costs as well as creating regional economic growth relationships?' For example, could concurrent obligations
be imposed on suburban municipalities whereby they must take affirmative steps to coordinate aspects of their local economies with cities in
their regions?" If we cannot yet link people, can we link the markets on
which they depend?
for meeting housing need outside its borders by saying, "That's really what this case is all
about." HAAR, supra note 11, at 21. What evolved was a doctrine concerned with fulfilling the poor's need for development with suburban integration. However, the township's obligation, as history now shows, could just as logically have been satisfied by directing development resources into the state's cities.
In Mount Laurel II, the New Jersey Supreme Court made several references to the
development-oriented benefits that would theoretically accrue to low-income residents
once they had moved to suburbia. These benefits were at the root of some of the inclusionary zoning techniques discussed in the opinion. For example, incentive zoning and
mandatory set-asides both create means by which low-income residents may live in the
same housing alongside upper-income residents with the goal of "provid[ing] adequate
access and services for the lower income residents and at the same time protect[ing] as
much as possible the value and integrity of the project as a whole." 92 N.J. 158, 268,
456 A.2d 390, 446 (1983). The latter concern, protecting property "value and integrity",
represents an attempt at balance whose controversy in the suburban realm may be without
rival. Arguably, the inability to strike such a balance is what led to renewed attempts to
re-direct Mount Laurel to New Jersey's cities.
6 Presently, COAH's regulations require the sending municipality to write a checkor checks, if paying in installments-but little else in order to be certified as discharging
up to half of its fair share obligation through an RCA. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5 § 9211.2 (1996). Indeed, both the regulations and the terms of typical RCAs require more of
the receiving municipality by way of compliance procedures, regular submissions, auditing as well as substantive requirements that require administrative outlays than the sending municipality. See id.; Interview with Ron Cuneo, Principal Planner, Council on Affordable Housing (Jan. 17, 1997) (notes on file with the author). Even COAH's
enforcement and oversight of RCA responsibilities under N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5 §§ 9111.6 and 5:92-11.6 goes mainly to preventing fraud (of which there is apparently little
evidence so far) by the receiver than anything else. See id. The scope of the sending
municipality's connection to the receiving one is essentially a cash-per-unit transfer.
87 Under N.J. ADMIN. CODE 5:91-11.4, both the sending and receiving municipality
must forward to the county planning agency its master plan and zoning ordinances. This
enables the planning agency to review aspects of the proposed RCA for their impact on
regional planning, with specific reference to the comprehensive regional master plan.
Interview with Ron Cuneo, supra note 88. This review proceeds on the basis of a checklist. Id. However, the checklist is concerned specifically with (i) access to employment
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We really do not have answers to these and related questions yet, in
part because this objective has not been openly embraced. These are
among the many questions, however, we look to social science to answer
for us in gauging how successfully Mount Laurel achieved an objective
that has evolved from the underside of its early aims. These are community economic development questions. The RCA regulatory scheme, as
currently configured, reflects an extremely (and unjustifiably) limited
community development objective: rehabilitating and building affordable
housing units. This is superficial in its scope compared to the justices'
underlying concerns expressed in Mount Laurel I and II and clearly requires more.
B. Beyond Regional ContributionAgreements
One aspect of the urban narrative already seems certain, however:
the broader objectives of community economic development in New Jersey's cities will not be satisfied by the generation of new and rehabilitated affordable housing through RCAs as currently drafted. Housing
development is one good, and it is frequently associated with general
neighborhood improvement. But it rarely involves the reconceptualization of local markets, institutions and services that is entailed in what I
have described as community economic development. Nor can housing
development alone redefine the nature of relationships between poor
families and, for example, their political representatives or their schools,
so that quality of life concerns and prospects for greater life options are
broached in a regular dialogue between entities that understand and reinforce each other as part of a continuing community fabric. These are,
however, precisely the kinds of public and private goods available to
residents of middle income suburban neighborhoods. A membership
symbolically pledged through housing, residents of New Jersey's economically stable townships receive a great deal more than a roof over
their heads.' They participate directly and indirectly in the goods and
opportunities; (ii) consistency with the current land use element in each municipality
(mainly transit); (iii) consistency with the current transportation elements; and (iv) water
quality management. (Checklist available from COAH Office of Public Information)
Although important, these items on their face do not create any affirmative obligations on
the part of the sending municipality to integrate any of its local economic development
planning with the receiving institution. While such integration may not always be feasible, the failure to provide for its consideration at the RCA approval stage represents a
glaring oversight that compounds the burdens on the receiving municipality. See infra
notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
as As Roger Montgomery and Daniel Mandelker have stated:
Housing denotes an enormously complicated idea. It refers to a whole
collection of things that come packaged together, not just four walls and a
roof, but a specific location in relation to work and services, neighbors and
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services reproduced through the community social and economic infrastructure. Arguably, these townships, like suburbs across the country,
were built on these assumptions of collective benefits and continue to be
designed this way." Membership, as we have seen, has been systematically denied to others chiefly out of concerns that such benefits would be
diminished if particular outsiders were allowed to participate.' Thus, it
would be a foolish hope indeed to expect that the mere donation of some
units of affordable housing would engender a process of reconstructed
markets, institutional relationships, employment opportunities and citizen
participation in communities whose design, if one can be found, and resulting make-up consistently gives rise to failure.
Because such a result could be fairly regarded as the ultimate perversion of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, the late-emerging community economic objective must have called for more. That is, even the provision
in the FHA establishing RCAs must be read together with the judicial
edicts in Mount Laurel I and H to require some regionalization of not just
the need for affordable housing, but the need for membership in communities in which there exists a dynamic and working infrastructure of public and private goods and services. The questions that necessarily follow
are for both law and social science. The legal inquiry begins with how
the New Jersey Legislature's passage of the FHA can be read consistently
with what I argue is the clearly motivating force behind the judicial doctrine that declared the existence of locally-based fair share obligations of
a regional scope. This is a matter of both interpretation and effectuation
of legislative purpose. The social science inquiry begins with how suburbs and cities in New Jersey can formally regionalize economic opportunities.9"

neighborhood, property rights and privacy provisions, income and investment opportunities, and emotional or psychological symbols and supports.
HOUSING INAMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 3 (Roger Montgomery & Daniel R.
Mandelker eds., 2d ed. 1979). This "package" also includes access to information networks that often serve as the defining character of employment opportunities and the realistic chance of self-sufficiency. See Wilson, supra note 70.
89 See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 56-98, (Yale Univ. Press 1994); LEO MARX, THE
MACHINE IN THE GARDEN 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 1964).
go Conversely, Massey and Denton argue that even the white poor, by not having to
live in the same concentrated poverty as the black poor, benefit from racial segregation
and exclusion. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 9, 128-29.
91 In this vein, commentators have argued the necessity of more regionalized government whereby the city-suburban decision making divide is subsumed by
"metropolitan" government with broader authority for the interests advanced by economic development generally. See, e.g. RUSK, supra note 43, at 33-35, 89-119 (arguing
that "elastic" metropolitan areas have greater authority and incentives for decreasing seg-
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It is likely that these questions will be answered with greater reliance upon regional land use and economic planning processes, including,
but not limited to, the continued use of RCAs. In order to generate the
kind of community economic development discussed earlier, it is imperative that low-income residents and their neighborhoods are connected
with the jobs, goods, and services located in local economies in other
parts of the state. Again, this is where the Doctrine and the Act stopped
short, leaving us with only RCAs. As we have seen, these agreements
are not sufficiently regional in their scope.' It would be consistent with
Mount Laurel's emphasis on land use controls to re-examine the role of
regional economic and land use planning on community economic development. Moreover, given the subsidies that more affluent municipalities
arguably enjoy as a result of RCA transfers, it is incumbent upon those
same municipalities not simply to contribute units of affordable housing
to cities with high concentrations of poverty, but additionally to share in
the larger economic burdens those cities carry."
I am therefore proposing that the seeds of urban revitalization may
be contained in some of Mount Laurel's earliest assumptions about community economic stability. Many of those assumptions were confined
unnecessarily within suburban borders, despite a greater relevance. What
is clear since the filing of the law suit in 1971 is that the New Jersey Supreme Court was prophetic in focusing on suburban growth within the
context of regionalized economic relationships. What remains far from
clear is how the most marginalized communities in the state can participate in this larger dynamic.' Given the Wish-Eisdorfer study's findings
regation, controlling land use and promoting economic growth than characteristic of
"inelastic" old cities surrounded by suburbs).
92 Id.
9 The subsidy is primarily what many affluent communities feared in the first place:
Higher taxes for expanded public services, such as police and public school facilities.
More affluent communities enjoy lower tax rates, because these higher costs are not absorbed through local revenues. Instead, these costs are shifted to cities with high poverty
concentrations, which then suffer chronic fiscal shortages in part because local revenues
cannot possibly cover the higher costs. See Fox, supra note 11, at 539-41 & n. 29. Although this is a common feature of exclusionary zoning, it was not remedied by the FHA.
The suggestion made here is not unlike linkage fees and other exactions levied against the
beneficiaries of land use controls.
9 This is especially pressing given that New Jersey's development has not been exclusively "suburban" since the Supreme Court first joined Mount Laurel issues in 1971.
Much of the state's employment and residential development has emerged in quasi-urban,
quasi-suburban areas of the state near regional interchanges such as Interstates-78 and
287. The sometimes bucolic office parks being built in these twilight zones of formidable
new commerce were planned in order to maximize the myriad benefits of regionalized
economies, including proximity to established urban centers (e.g., New York City), air
travel and ground transportation; executive and employee "quality of life" priorities; and
lower-cost, lower-density commercial real estate. White collar employment opportunities
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on the probable failure of integration strategies as the primary means of
nexus, we are wise to direct some of those critical social science resources at more effectively planning for economic relationships where
people live.
CONCLUSION

It is tempting to look upon the entire experience of Mount Laurel as
social science research, except that people are still living it. From its in-

ception, Mount Laurel promised to be a story of exclusion, race, class,
urban vs. suburban space, development, and community. These are
powerful and often illusory constructs, and it would be hard for anyone
to tell it the same way twice. It is still being told. What is necessary to
the telling is continued research so that we may better satisfy its objectives and, hopefully, find common ownership in its history.

appear to dictate many of these business planning choices. However, as successful as
these pockets of development have been, there is little evidence showing consideration of
how to include nearby residents of traditional inner cities, such as Newark and Elizabeth,
New Jersey. See JOEL GARREAu, EDGE CrrY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRoNTIER 21-68 (1991).

